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Corporations have an ever-increasing influence on international human rights. However, 
public international law hardly ever regulates corporate conduct directly and the debate 
is stuck on the theoretical question of corporate subjectivity in international law. Interna-
tional soft law regimes, such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights, constitute a major progress on the field by bringing together the corporate world 
and international human rights law in an unprecedented way. Nevertheless, it is evident 
that none of the current international instruments regarding business and human rights are 
binding in a judicial sense. They rely their efficiency on the voluntary implementations 
on national level and the power of social expectations, both of which have their own 
issues.  
From this starting point, the study examines the need to set binding international human 
rights law standards for business and human rights. The focus is further directed to the 
process of human rights due diligence, which comprises an ongoing management process 
that a corporation needs to undertake to analyze the impacts of its activities on human 
rights. The need to shift towards mandatory business and human rights regime is currently 
being addressed by the intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises with respect to human rights, which is in the spring 2020 
in the middle of the process of drafting a legally binding instrument. 
The study finds that both the UNGPS and the new proposed treaty have their own 
strengths and weaknesses, and that it is necessary to continue with a plurality of initiatives 
to most effectively enhance corporate human rights responsibility. However, the study 
concludes that a mandatory human rights due diligence would provide a solution which 
both clarifies the expectations on corporations to have an adequate human rights due dil-
igence processes in place and provides an effective corporate accountability mechanism. 
The study arrives at these conclusions by analyzing extensively material related to the 
UN Guiding Principles as well as the new treaty process. The most important sources also 
include a wide range of scholarly material, such as Human Rights Obligations of Business 
– Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect edited by Surya Deva and David 
Bilchitz and A Theory of Legal Responsibility by Steven Ratner. 
International law – Human rights – Business and human rights – UN Guiding Principles 
– Human rights due diligence – Corporate human rights responsibility  
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Yritysten vaikutus kansainvälisiin ihmisoikeuksiin kasvaa jatkuvasti. Kansainvälinen jul-
kisoikeus ei kuitenkaan lähes koskaan sääntele yritystoimintaa suoraan, ja keskustelu on 
juuttunut teoreettiseen kysymykseen yritysten oikeushenkilöllisyydestä kansainvälisessä 
oikeudessa. Kansainväliset soft law -lähteet, kuten YK:n yrityksiä ja ihmisoikeuksia kos-
kevat ohjaavat periaatteet, edustavat merkittävää edistymistä tällä alalla yhdistämällä yri-
tysmaailman ja kansainvälisen ihmisoikeuden ennennäkemättömällä tavalla. Siitä huoli-
matta on selvää, ettei mikään nykyisistä yritystoimintaa ja ihmisoikeuksia koskevista kan-
sainvälisistä välineistä ole sitova oikeudellisessa mielessä. Niiden tehokkuus perustuu 
kansallisen tason vapaaehtoisiin toteutuksiin ja sosiaalisten odotusten voimaan, joihin 
molempiin liittyy omat haasteensa. 
Tästä lähtökohdasta käsin tutkimuksessa selvitetään tarvetta asettaa sitovat kansainväliset 
ihmisoikeusstandardit yritystoiminnalle ja ihmisoikeuksille. Tutkimuksessa keskitytään 
edelleen huolellisuusvelvoitteen prosessiin, joka käsittää jatkuvan riskienhallintaproses-
sin, joka yrityksen on suoritettava analysoidakseen toimintansa vaikutuksia ihmisoikeuk-
siin. YK:n ihmisoikeusneuvoston hallitusten välinen työryhmä käsitellee tällä hetkellä 
tarvetta siirtyä pakottavaan sääntelykenttään yritystoiminnan ja ihmisoikeuksien saralla, 
ja se on keväällä 2020 keskellä prosessia laatia kansainvälinen oikeudellisesti sitova asia-
kirja ihmisoikeuksista monikansallisten yhtiöiden ja muiden yritysten toiminnassa. 
 
Tutkimuksen mukaan sekä YK:n ohjaavilla periaatteilla, että uudella ehdotetulla sopi-
muksella on omat vahvuutensa ja heikkoutensa, ja on välttämätöntä jatkaa useilla aloit-
teilla, jotta voidaan parantaa tehokkaimmin yritysten ihmisoikeusvastuuta. Tutkimuk-
sessa päädytään kuitenkin siihen, että pakottava huolellisuusvelvoite tarjoaisi ratkaisun, 
joka sekä selventää yrityksille asetettuja odotuksia siitä, että niillä on asianmukaiset pro-
sessit huolellisuusvelvoitteen toteuttamiseksi että tarjoaa tehokkaan yritysvastuumeka-
nismin. 
 
Tutkimuksessa päädytään näihin johtopäätöksiin analysoimalla laajasti YK:n ohjaaviin 
periaatteisiin ja uuteen sopimusprosessiin liittyvää materiaalia. Tärkeimpiin lähteisiin si-
sältyy myös laaja valikoima oikeuskirjallisuutta, kuten Surya Devan ja David Bilchitzin 
toimittama Human Rights Obligations of Business – Beyond the Corporate Responsibility 
to Respect sekä Steven Ratnerin A Theory of Legal Responsibility. 
 
Kansainvälinen oikeus – Ihmisoikeudet – Yritystoiminta ja ihmisoikeudet – YK:n ohjaa-
vat periaatteet – Huolellisuusvelvoite – Yritysten ihmisoikeusvastuu  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
The international human rights law has already for decades been aware of the ever-in-
creasing power of corporations in the world. This well-established notion has resulted in 
shifting the attention from the exclusive interest on human rights violations committed 
by states to a close scrutiny of the activities of corporations. While investments and jobs 
created by corporations have several positive impacts, such as increased standard of liv-
ing, the corporations’ activities may also infringe human rights, for example the right to 
privacy or the right to enjoy just and favorable conditions of work.1 
Considering the influence of corporations on the international human rights, it is remark-
able that, at almost all cases, public international law regulates corporate conduct only 
indirectly.2 The attribution of responsibility for human rights violations to corporations 
has been stuck in the theoretical question of international legal personality of corporations 
and the lack of horizontal effects of international human rights law. I argue that it is pos-
sible to grant the corporations a level of international personality and that it is important 
to include corporations among the subjects of international law. However, the focus 
should be on finding the best tools to regulate corporations, taking into account their spe-
cial characteristics, and not only continue the debate over the theoretical question of in-
ternational personality.3 The time when international law could divide actors solely into 
states and non-state actors is over, and the corporations’ influence on the international 
human rights requires them to be seen as obligors alongside of the states. 
                                                 
1 The right to privacy may be infringed by failing to protect the confidentiality of personal data held about 
employees. By failing to address a pattern of accidents that risk health and safety of employees a corporation 
may infringe the right to enjoy just and favourable conditions of work. For an extensive list of human rights 
that corporations may have negative impacts on, please see https://www.ungpreporting.org/resources/how-
businesses-impact-human-rights/. 
2 Vázquez 2005, p. 927. As few exceptions, the author mentions international legal norms relating to war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and forced labour that apply to non-state actors, such as corporations, 
directly. 
3 See Clapham 2006, pp. 80 and 83, where he argues that one should not try to “squeeze international actors 
into the state-like entities box” and that the focus should be in the rights and duties of non-state entities, not 
the theoretical question of their personality. 
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Moreover, I argue that the black-and-white thinking where corporations are seen as the 
“bad guys” who intentionally violate human rights in every possible turn is faulty. It is 
rather the fault of the uncertain circumstances that leave corporations not knowing what 
is expected from them.4 Corporations that would like to act ethically may struggle to find 
the right way to operate if they do not have clear standards to follow.5 Voluntary instru-
ments such as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(UNGPs or UN Guiding Principles) have been a major progress in clarifying the relation-
ship of states and corporations and the attribution of human rights responsibility between 
them. The UNGPs emphasize human rights due diligence (HRDD) as a tool in determin-
ing the human rights impacts of corporations and, thus, take an important step towards 
enhancing the corporate responsibility for human rights. However, the UNGPs still fail 
to formulate the legal status of corporations as duty-bearers6 and are dependent on na-
tional level positive regulation leaving an atmosphere of uncertainty prevailing.  
My main argument is that human rights infringements caused by corporate activities take 
place when corporations are not paying enough attention to the potential impacts they 
have on human rights. In order to ensure adequate due diligence, there is a need for an 
international binding human rights treaty that would set global standards for mandatory 
human rights due diligence. To illustrate the need for a shift from voluntary to mandatory, 
the famous Doe v. Wal-Mart (2009) case in the United States serves as a good example. 
There were several plaintiffs in this case who argued that Wal-Mart, an American multi-
national retail corporation, had failed to enforce its code of conduct, which required its 
suppliers to comply with labor and industry standards. The code of conduct further re-
quired Wal-Mart to undertake measures, such as on-site inspections, to monitor the com-
pliance with the standards, and that failure to implement the standards could lead to ter-
mination of the suppliers’ contract with Wal-Mart. The court held that Wal-Mart had only 
reserved a right to inspect which did not amount to a duty to inspect the working condi-
tions in their supply chain. Therefore, the workers could not receive protection by the 
contracts and the code of conduct clauses between Wal-Mart and its suppliers.7  Without 
                                                 
4 Ratner 2001, p. 448. Ratner refers to a corporate policy statement of the Royal Dutch/Shell group of 
companies, where it says: ”It has often been difficult for [NGOs, the media, and others] to agree on... a 
theoretical framework for a new understanding of business's role in... human rights.... As a result, it has 
been difficult for business to respond to expectations that appear to be changing significantly ...". 
5 See Deva 2003. 
6 Karavias 2014, p. 83. 
7 See Angelini 2018. 
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clear international standards, it is likely that we will continue to witness claims against 
corporations for their responsibility and, in turn, counterclaims by the corporations 
against such accountability.8 
1.2 Research and Important Terms 
In this thesis, I examine the aforementioned need for a binding treaty to complement the 
current regulation of corporations’ human rights due diligence in the UNGPs. In order to 
do that, I search answers for the following questions. I start by looking into the question 
of why the state monopoly of human rights responsibility is not sufficient alone but cor-
porate responsibility should complement the state responsibility. States are set a require-
ment of due diligence in international human rights law and, increasingly, the states have 
also started to regulate corporate human rights due diligence in national laws. However, 
due to many weaknesses in leaving the responsibility solely on states, the corporations 
also need to be recognized as having a level of international legal personality and, corre-
spondingly, attribute them responsibility for assessing their impacts on human rights di-
rectly through international human rights law. This leads me to analyze the strengths and 
weaknesses of the human rights due diligence process in the UNGPs, and finally to search 
the answer to my main research question: how would mandatory human rights due dili-
gence enhance the corporate responsibility for protecting human rights? 
Both the legal dogmatic and legal sociology methods are used to be able to answer these 
questions. The interest in background and effects is characteristic of legal sociology and 
these play a great role throughout the thesis.9 On the other hand, the legal dogmatic 
method is strongly present since the thesis compares the two approaches that international 
law has to the regulation of business and human rights: the voluntary instruments and the 
binding treaty. The approach is both de lege lata and de lege ferenda since I assess criti-
cally the adopted UNGPs and I also analyze the future development regarding the pro-
posed binding treaty. 
I have conducted the research by studying the relevant sources of international law as 
provided in the Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The 
                                                 
8 Ratner 2001, p. 448. 
9 Alvesalo and Ervasti 2006, p. 9. 
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primary sources, such as international treaties and principles, form the core of the re-
search. To understand how the proposed treaty could enhance corporate human rights 
responsibility, the sessions where the new instrument has been built and the views of 
different participants thereto are of great interest in this thesis. As secondary sources, 
relevant judicial decisions are presented as examples. A wide range of scholarly material 
has also been studied as further secondary sources including, among others, Human 
Rights Obligations of Business – Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect edited 
by Surya Deva and David Bilchitz and A Theory of Legal Responsibility by Steven Ratner. 
Furthermore, I have studied scholarly material and the UN Guiding Principles themselves 
to analyze the effectiveness of the UNGPs. At this point, I would also like to give credit 
to Lia Heasman whose academic dissertation from 2018 inspired me to study the corpo-
rate responsibility for human rights and to present the latest turns in the process towards 
mandatory human rights due diligence in my thesis. 
To clarify further my course of research, the definitions of some regularly used terms are 
presented next. The term corporation is used in a wide meaning to cover all business 
enterprises similarly as explained in connection with the UNGPs: “regardless of their size, 
sector, location, ownership and structure”.10 The international law has been criticized for 
its focus on large, non-state-owned multinational corporations and the lack of attention 
towards the role of municipal corporations and small and medium-sized business corpo-
rations.11 I find this criticism well-founded since also smaller corporations may gravely 
affect the human rights. On the other hand, the multinational character of some of the 
corporations poses its own challenges in the regulation, and these are brought up where 
relevant. 
Similarly, the human rights are discussed in their wide meaning. Corporations may have 
direct or indirect impact on virtually the entire spectrum of internationally recognized 
human rights, so they should all be covered in the risk assessment. Alongside with the 
corporations’ impacts on the human rights comes their responsibility for human rights 
violations. The general term corporate responsibility is used instead of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) where it is intended to assess the question of responsibility in a wider 
sense without the meanings associated to CSR that has existed already before the business 
                                                 
10 UN Guiding Principles 2011, p. 1. 
11 Johns 2016, p. 638. 
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and human rights discourse. CSR focuses more on the corporate goodwill based on mo-
rality, but the interest of this thesis is to underline the rights and especially obligations 
that the international human rights standards of business and human rights create. Fur-
thermore, CSR deals with the responsibilities of a company but business and human rights 
discourse addresses the responsibility of states and corporations in an integrated way.12 
On a separate note, I want to emphasize that even though the focus of this thesis is on 
human rights, the traditional classification of corporate responsibility to environmental, 
social and economic responsibility seems rather artificial today. Ideally, all of the afore-
mentioned classes of responsibility should be integrated in the everyday business opera-
tions of corporations to guarantee that these once separately conducted processes are im-
plemented seamlessly in the core of the corporate activities. 
Lastly, as will be explained more thoroughly below, the focus in the thesis is directed to 
human rights due diligence. HRDD is a key concept of the UNGPs, but there is no inter-
national consensus on the definition.13 The Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR) has sought to define the term as follows: 
“Such a measure of prudence, activity, or assiduity, as is properly to be expected from, and 
ordinarily exercised by, a reasonable and prudent [person or enterprise] under the particular 
circumstances; not measured by any absolute standard, but depending on the relative facts 
of the special case. In the context of the Guiding Principles, human rights due diligence 
comprises an ongoing management process that a reasonable and prudent enterprise needs 
to undertake, in light of its circumstances (including sector, operating context, size and 
similar factors) to meet its responsibility to respect human rights.”14 
The definition is helpful but leaves some uncertainty on how HRDD is to be applied. I 
will get back to analyzing the definition of HRDD more thoroughly in the chapter 3.2 
regarding the UNGPs and HRDD. On an initial remark, it may be stated that corporations 
need to have a coherent understanding on the demands that HRDD sets in order to know 
what they are expected in relation to protecting human rights. 
                                                 
12 Wettstein 2016, p. 80. 
13 McCorquodale and others 2017, p. 198. 
14 Interpretive Guide 2012, p. 6. 
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1.3 Structure and Limitations 
The structure of the thesis is built to support the answering of the research questions. 
After this introductory chapter, I move on to analyze the shift from the complete monop-
oly of states’ human rights responsibility to the inclusion of corporate responsibility in 
the field of international human rights law. I argue that strictly limiting the role of duty-
bearer to states is not sufficient, but states need to collaborate with corporations in order 
to guarantee the best possible protection of human rights. Furthermore, the emergence of 
due diligence in international law and its importance in connecting corporate world and 
human rights are presented. 
After assessing the need to involve corporations more in the full-scale protection of hu-
man rights, I critically review the current international voluntary regulation of human 
rights due diligence. The focus will be on the United Nations’ (UN) work on the field 
even though also the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
and the International Labour Organization (ILO) have international instruments in place 
regarding corporations’ human rights due diligence.15 The limitation of focus to UN is 
justified since the aim of the thesis is not to give a full review of the current sphere of 
regulating the human rights and corporations through human rights due diligence, but to 
analyze the strengths and weaknesses of complementing the voluntary regime with a 
binding international instrument. Furthermore, despite their flaws, the UNGPs seem to be 
the most promising basis of the voluntary instruments issued so far for the future work on 
the worldwide implementation of human rights due diligence. Also, the recent progress 
within the UN Human Rights Council regarding a binding treaty in the field of human 
rights and corporations further justifies the focus of the analysis on the UN’s work. 
Further limitation is also made to focus on one aspect in the fight against human rights 
violations, the human rights due diligence. This limitation is due to, on the one hand, the 
central role of risk, or more precisely impact, assessment in preventing human rights vi-
olations and, on the other hand, my personal interest on the possibility to utilize the tra-
ditionally business-centric due diligence in the sphere of international human rights law. 
                                                 
15 See OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises as part of the OECD Declaration on International 
Investments and Multinational Enterprises, which was adopted in 1976 and has been last reviewed in 2011. 
See also ILO’s Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, 
which was adopted in 1977 and has been amended in 2000 and 2006. 
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Access to justice and remedies are naturally essential requirements of the possible future 
treaty regarding business and human rights, but they are out of the scope of this thesis due 
to the limited number of pages. In addition, the goal is that, by setting mandatory human 
rights due diligence on corporations, the HRDD process may prevent beforehand as many 
human rights harms as possible. Thus, even though remedies will be needed, they hope-
fully will not be needed that much should the preventing processes succeed. 
The critical analysis of the UNGPs and the voluntary nature of the current international 
HRDD regime leads to the fourth chapter where I present the treaty process of the open-
ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises with respect to human rights (OEIGWG), namely the proposed legally binding 
instrument. A short overview of the status of conducting the treaty is presented. Again, 
the goal is not to review the full process and progress of the working group but to focus 
on the strengths and weaknesses of the possible mandatory regulation in the field of busi-
ness and human rights. Evaluation on the binding nature of the proposed treaty is pre-
sented, but to maintain coherence, the research is also here limited to the human rights 
due diligence, more precisely to the analysis of the elements of mandatory HRDD. 
In the conclusion chapter, I conclude the analysis presented in the previous chapters and 
underline my central argument that a mandatory international human rights due diligence 
regime for corporations would not only enhance the protection of human rights but could 
also be a desired instrument from the corporations’ point of view. Further thoughts about 
how to strengthen the proposed treaty in this regard are also presented taking especially 
into account the challenges posed by globalization and digitalization. 
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2 FROM THE MONOPOLY OF STATE HUMAN RIGHTS 
RESPONSIBILITY TO THE INCLUSION OF CORPORATE HUMAN 
RIGHTS RESPONSIBILITY 
2.1 State Human Rights Responsibility 
2.1.1 State Monopoly of Human Rights Responsibility 
The doctrine of the subjects of international law is part of the fundamentals of this branch 
of law. Every introductory textbook includes a section regarding the subjects of interna-
tional law and the question of international subjectivity keeps attracting the attention of 
scholars who debate over the content and reach of this doctrine.16 In the history, states 
were the only subjects of international law and it has taken time to move from the exclu-
sive state-centric model of the international legal system to recognize also other actors 
amongst the subjects of international law. 
Even today, the starting point of public international law is that states are the main actors 
of international law. This is due to their ability to possess international rights and obliga-
tions and, moreover, their capacity to a) maintain their rights by raising international 
claims and b) be subjected to such claims should they breach their obligations.17 Thus, 
states have so-called full legal capacity whereas the capacities of other recognized sub-
jects of international law, such as international organizations, are limited and determined 
by the powers vested in them.18 Furthermore, states have inherent sovereign rights and 
powers as part of their position as principal subjects of international law.19 As regards the 
doctrine of sovereignty, it includes the doctrine of state responsibility as a necessary re-
ciprocal element.20 
In international human rights law, the doctrine of state responsibility has led to finding 
states having a monopoly of human rights responsibility.21 The international regulation 
of human rights is strictly vertical in nature and makes it possible for only states to be 
                                                 
16 Pentikäinen 2012, p. 145. 
17 Crawford 2012, p. 115. 
18 Pentikäinen 2012, p. 146. 
19 Crawford 2012, p. 447. 
20 Korhonen – Selkälä 2016, p. 845. 
21 Crawford 2012, p. 655. 
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obliged in their execution. The so-called horizontal effect of human rights has tradition-
ally been seen against the foundation of human rights, and human rights are only indi-
rectly applied to private conduct so that the state remains the guarantor.22 
The state responsibility for protecting human rights is both positive, i.e. states must take 
positive measures in the protection of human rights, and negative, i.e. states must not 
themselves directly violate human rights.23 On a third point of view, the human rights 
conventions also require states to ensure that other actors than the state, such as corpora-
tions, do not violate the human rights of individuals within their jurisdiction. This is called 
the state’s duty to protect, which is an accepted responsibility in international human 
rights law.24 
2.1.2 State Due Diligence Requirement 
One of the elements attributed to the duty to protect is an international requirement of due 
diligence, which in this context refers to the state’s obligation to provide appropriate pre-
vention mechanisms and remedies for victims of human rights infringements.25 Due dil-
igence appeared for the first time in a judgment in relation to the state’s human rights 
obligations in the case Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras (1988) of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights. Honduras was held responsible for failing to prevent the attack, 
which led to an individual being disappeared and assumed to have been killed by the 
Honduran army, and for failing to punish the attackers. The wording of the judgement 
referred to Honduras’ “lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it”.26 
The due diligence requirement of states is also relevant in various human rights treaties. 
For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) may be 
regarded violated should a state party, according to the General Comment of the Human 
Rights Council, permit or fail “to take appropriate measures or to exercise due diligence 
to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm caused by such acts by private persons 
or entities”.27 Therefore, under the ICCPR, states have the responsibility to ensure that 
                                                 
22 Crawford 2012, p. 655. See also Heasman 2018, p. 37. 
23 Heasman 2018, pp. 37-38. 
24 Shaw 2008, p. 770; Chirwa 2004, p. 40. 
25 Kulesza 2016, p. 29. 
26 Velásquez-Rodrı́guez v. Honduras (1988), paragraph 174. 
27 UN Human Rights Committee 2004, paragraph 8. 
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individuals are protected from human rights violations by other private persons. This has 
also been stated by the Human Rights Committee in Delgado Páez v. Colombia (1990), 
where the state was required to protect an individual’s right to personal security in a hor-
izontal relation between private actors. 
However, states cannot be held responsible for all violations committed by private actors. 
According to the judgment of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, states are required to 
take appropriate measures with respect to its capabilities, which may depend on the situ-
ation at hand.28 Thus, the due diligence requirement draws a line between the violations 
of corporations and other private actors for which states can and cannot be held responsi-
ble. In the current state of the international human rights regulation, a lot is left to rest on 
the states’ national regulation when it comes to the protection of human rights from cor-
porate abuse. Problems arising from the state monopoly on human rights responsibility 
are assessed next. 
2.1.3 Weaknesses in State Monopoly of Human Rights Responsibility 
In a world where states could be counted on to control conduct within their territory ef-
fectively, protecting human rights solely through obligations on states seems fairly un-
disputable. However, corporations have consolidated their position as powerful global 
actors and some states lack the resources or the will to control them.29 Therefore, the 
current system of international human rights law, where the responsibility for human 
rights infringements by corporations is sought indirectly through states, has multiple 
weaknesses, which are categorized by Steven Ratner to the three following groups. 
Firstly, as already mentioned above, the state may lack the will or resources to monitor 
corporate behavior. This is especially true in less developed countries that are dependent 
on foreign investments. At worst, this shortcoming may even lead to the governments 
granting corporations control over certain territories leading to a total neglect and lack of 
interference in the possible human rights abuses in such region.30 Secondly, states and 
corporations may work together in abusing human rights. This has been seen to happen 
                                                 
28 Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras (1988), paragraphs 174-175. 
29 Ratner 2001, p. 461. 
30 Ratner 2001, p. 462. As examples, Ratner mentions the claims against Freeport-McMoRan regarding 
human rights abuses in Irian Jaya and the claims against Texaco in relation to the Colombian rainforest. 
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in South Africa, where the government has used corporate resources to supply them with 
material for various unacceptable activities.31 Thirdly, the globalization has led to a grow-
ing number of international corporations, which are less and less dependent on govern-
ment control. Corporations may have nationality in one state and operation in another. 
Should the host state fail to regulate the activities of the corporation, the corporation may 
be left in a legislative vacuum if the state of the corporation’s nationality also abstains 
from regulating the corporate activities based on, for example, the fact that such activities 
are not taking place in their jurisdiction, i.e. due to the extraterritorial nature of the activ-
ities. Corporations may also be moved relatively easily to another state with fewer human 
rights regulations.32 
In addition to the aforementioned weaknesses, the state’s role as the guarantor of human 
rights is diminishing due to the extensive privatization of state functions and the list could 
be continued even further.33 With this said, it is in fact starting to look disputable that 
states should possess the monopoly of human rights responsibility. The balance of power 
has shifted since the conduction of human rights conventions and today 69 of the world’s 
top 100 global economic entities are corporations, leaving room for just 31 countries on 
the list.34 As a state alone is not a sufficient guarantor of the human rights of its people, 
it is time to shift the focus on the possibility of attributing responsibility also to corporate 
actors. 
2.2 Corporate Human Rights Responsibility 
2.2.1 Status of Corporations in International Human Rights Law 
The recognition of subjectivity is at the core of the responsibility doctrine.35 Therefore, 
to understand the attribution of some of the responsibility for protecting human rights to 
corporations, one must first understand where corporations are placed in the field of sub-
jects of international law. According to the prevailing doctrine of subjects of international 
law, corporations do not have international legal personality.36 However, the debate of 
                                                 
31 Ratner 2001, pp. 462-463. 
32 Ratner 2011, p. 463. 
33 Alston 2005, p. 27. 
34 Global Justice Now 2017. 
35 Korhonen – Selkälä 2016, p. 846. 
36 Crawford 2012, p. 122. 
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the international subjectivity of corporations is far from settled. The views of scholars 
vary greatly, and it is not anymore that exceptional to support corporate international legal 
subjectivity even though strong resistance also pertains.37 Some scholars have simply left 
the question open.38 
Fleur Johns describes the theorizations of corporations in public international law, and 
she recognizes three main ways the corporations have featured in international law: as 
analogue to individuals, as parastatal entities and as an example of international co-ordi-
nation much in comparison to international institutions.39 All of the aforementioned cat-
egories have their own flaws because they fail to take into account the special character-
istics of corporations. First, corporations differ from individuals in many ways, not least 
because of their nature as profit-maximizing entities, which are able to relevantly easily 
opt in and out of national legal orders.40 Second, even though revenues of some corpora-
tions are beating the gross domestic products of many states, giving corporations state-
like role is not actually taming corporate power but granting corporations state-like au-
tonomy leaves them room to, for example, only voluntarily engage in protecting human 
rights.41 Third, analogue to an international organization emphasizes the possibility of 
demanding corporations transparency and social responsibility that is required from in-
ternational organizations. However, corporations, unlike international organizations, do 
not answer to states but to their shareholders, and such appeals may not be embraced if 
they do not benefit the shareholders.42 
In international human rights law, the theorization of corporations has typically revolved 
around a statist comparison. Due to the understanding of corporations’ growing impact 
on human rights, the focus has, however, shifted to treating corporations as their own 
group: not state-like but not merely part of the heterogeneous group of non-state actors. 
Already in 1949, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) acknowledged in its famous 
comment that “the subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their 
                                                 
37 Pentikäinen 2012, p. 174. 
38 Clapham 2016, pp. 76-77. 
39 Johns 2016, p. 638. 
40 Johns 2016, pp. 640-641. 
41 Johns 2016, p. 642. 
42 Johns 2016, p. 643. 
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nature or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depend upon the need of the com-
munity”.43 This has been argued to hold open the possibility that categories of interna-
tional legal personality may be reconsidered in time.44 
Moreover, when examining the question of international legal personality of corporations, 
the focus should be on their rights and duties. If international law grants corporations or 
other non-state actors rights and duties, they may be seen to have international legal per-
sonality.45 Although not brought up often in the discussion of business and human rights, 
corporations actually possess rights under international human rights law. For example, 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) offers a wide range of protection for 
corporations, such as the right to protection of private property, which applies expressly 
to “every natural and legal person”.46 Thus, corporations’ capability to be right-holders is 
recognizable. 
However, the question of corporations’ role as duty-bearers is more troublesome. As dis-
cussed previously in connection with the state obligations, international human rights law 
indirectly poses certain obligations to corporations. If judicial duties exist only through 
the states, they are argued not to indicate a level of international legal personality for 
corporations.47 This notion is further argued by some scholars that, since there does not 
exist a binding treaty directly regulating corporations, corporations do not possess inter-
national legal personality because there is not a valid treaty issuing them judicial duties.48 
Therefore, a legally binding treaty that is specifically drafted for corporations would grant 
the corporations international legal personality since the treaty would assign them legal 
rights and duties. 
As such treaty has not yet been concluded, the best solution to clarify the current status 
of corporations is to give them limited rights and duties taking into account their special 
characteristics.49 States could include corporations more in the development of public 
                                                 
43 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (1949), p. 8. 
44 Alston 2005, p. 19. 
45 Reinisch 2005, p. 70. 
46 Emberland 2006, p. 3. 
47 Heasman 2018, p. 68. 
48 Rigaux 1991, p. 129; Cassese 1986, p. 103. 
49 Charney 1983, p. 775. 
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international law and the corporations would then acquire limited legal personality con-
trolled within international law.50 Furthermore, Surya Deva notes that corporations have 
a limited legal personality due to their legal construction derived from states and due to 
their status under international law which is extended from domestic law.51 
To conclude, even though the corporations do not have a similar status of legal subjects 
as states, they have a level of international legal personality. The notion is not without 
concerns. On the one hand, the states may fear losing international power by granting 
legal personality to corporations. On the other hand, expanding responsibility for human 
rights protection to corporations is feared to lead to states evading their own responsibil-
ity.52 However, making this concession does not mean that corporations have the full 
range of rights and duties that are possessed by states. Nor does it mean that the states’ 
rights and duties are diminished. Distributing powers would adjust the levels of power 
between states and corporations but not abolish the powers of the state.53 In the human 
rights context, the fundamental element of international human rights law demands that 
the actors who are capable of abusing human rights must be obliged to protect those 
rights. Along with states, corporations are actors that violate human rights. Thus, includ-
ing corporations in the group of actors that are held responsible for human rights obliga-
tions requires them to be capable of obtaining rights and duties and, consequently, being 
able to violate those duties.54 Therefore, to guarantee the protection of human rights, it is 
important to recognize that corporations are actors in the international order but simulta-
neously not to limit the role of the states. 
2.2.2 Theories of Incorporating Corporate Human Rights Responsibility 
In the same way as there are many theories on the international legal personality of cor-
porations, there are also several theories on the ways to involve corporations in the pro-
tection of human rights. The normative framework of corporate human rights obligations 
may be roughly divided into three legal sources: national law, international law and soft 
law, the last mainly referring to voluntary commitments by the corporations themselves.55 
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There is not a consensus among the international law scholars from which of these ways 
should the legal obligations of corporations primarily derive. Therefore, an analysis of 
these different theories is presented below. 
Those who promote maintaining status quo support the option that national normative 
orders should continue to solely regulate companies through domestic laws. As argued 
already in connection with the state’s duty to protect, the national human rights laws play 
an essential role in ensuring the horizontal protection of human rights within their juris-
dictions. Furthermore, many states have derived their human rights rules from the inter-
national human rights conventions harmonizing the application of human rights world-
wide. However, in much of the same way as the states may not be left to be the only ones 
to protect human rights due to the many weaknesses presented in previous chapters, also 
the regulation of human rights solely on national level is not enough to protect human 
rights. This is especially due to the increasing transnational character of corporations 
which makes it easy for corporations to abstain human rights regulations by simply mov-
ing their business to a state where the human rights protection is not at an adequate level. 
The national human rights laws need to exist and develop further, but to fill possible 
governmental gaps, the international human rights law needs to step in to regulate corpo-
rations. 
Straightforwardly, there are two main alternatives among international human rights 
scholars regarding the way international law should regulate corporate obligations. The 
more traditional option is that the state’s primary role in human rights protection is em-
phasized but a simultaneous responsibility for corporations is established with interna-
tional laws.56 For example, the UNGPs follow this view by issuing the primary responsi-
bility for human rights protection to states and leaving the companies a baseline expecta-
tion to respect rights. The more controversial option would be to demand a direct legal 
accountability of corporations. The scholars who promote this option do not intend to stop 
the states’ international obligations, but they promote more distinct and direct judicial 
legal norms.57 The strengths and weaknesses of these two options are presented in more 
depth in the following chapters. 
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Lastly, corporations themselves have also taken actions through voluntary commitments, 
such as internal human rights policies and codes of conduct.58 These are not the central 
subject of this thesis, but it may shortly be noted that the voluntary instruments are an 
important add to the national and international law obligations. Some of the policies have 
been condemned for focusing only on improving the corporation’s public reputation,59 
but some have succeeded in truly answering to shareholders’ and customers’ demand for 
more responsibility in the corporate activities.60 However, the corporate codes of conduct 
have been criticized to include only some human rights and omitting others. Most of them 
also fail to support the monitoring of their implementation.61 Nevertheless, even if such 
voluntary instruments are only a small part in the large exercise to identify corporate hu-
man rights obligations, the voluntary commitments of corporations are an important part 
since they contribute to corporate observance of human rights.62 
The regulation of corporations derives from internal and external sources, from national 
and international sources. What is common to all the different ways of incorporation is 
that they demand some insight into the corporation’s operation to ensure they do not vio-
late human rights, i.e. they require due diligence on the company’s part. Therefore, after 
the above-presented initial thoughts on the possible ways to incorporate the corporate 
human rights responsibility, it is equally important to turn the focus on the actual obliga-
tion, namely human rights due diligence (HRDD), that these instruments require corpo-
rations to conduct. 
2.2.3 Corporate Obligation of Human Rights Due Diligence 
Traditionally, due diligence has had a strict business-centered meaning. The concept 
emerged in corporate governance after the great depression of 1930’s in connection with 
the United States Securities Act of 1939, which provided a defence of due diligence to 
those who had made reasonable investigation into matters contained in a prospectus for 
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the issue of securities.63 Risk assessment is in the core of due diligence process and in 
corporate law due diligence often relates to commercial acquisition of a company or as-
sets. The content of due diligence varies according to the case at hand, but it can include 
the examination of legal, tax and financial structure and compliance of a corporation in-
volved in the transaction.64 
In the sphere of international law, due diligence has been recognized as the state’s duty 
to prevent and punish the harm caused by private actors, such as corporations. This has 
already been discussed in connection with the state’s duty to protect in chapter 2.1.2. 
Therefore, interest can be shifted to the corporation’s obligation of human rights due dil-
igence. Due to the increasing concern with the protection of human rights vulnerable to 
being violated by corporations, it is not enough that states conduct due diligence, but due 
diligence has become the cornerstone of developing international legal framework to reg-
ulate corporations’ actions in connection with human rights.65 
Human rights due diligence differs greatly from the original use of due diligence in cor-
porate activities. The key aspect to understand is that HRDD does not actually focus on 
human rights risks, but on human rights impacts.66 Thus, HRDD’s aim is not to avoid 
liability by flagging risks, but to understand the corporation’s harmful human rights im-
pacts and to change the corporation’s operations where needed according to the findings. 
Furthermore, HRDD is an on-going and dynamic process, unlike corporate due diligence 
that is oftentimes linked to a specific transaction.67 Corporation’s operations change over 
time and the human rights due diligence process needs to follow the changing business 
activities. 
Despite these differences, the human rights due diligence establishes a link between cor-
porate law and human rights law that was thought not to exist.68 As a result of the common 
terminology of due diligence, human rights policy makers and corporate representatives 
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speak better the same language and can define a process which both sides understand. 
Out of the instruments of international law, the UNGPs have greatly promoted the transi-
tion of due diligence that corporations were accustomed to performing in commercial 
transactions into the sphere of human rights.69 However, the UNGPs do not yet pose a 
legal obligation to conduct a due diligence process in any manner, so a question prevails: 
is it enough to regulate human rights due diligence at international level in voluntary in-
struments? To answer the question, the focus is further directed to the UNGPs and the 
assessment of the voluntary HRDD regime they provide. 
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3 EVALUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE IN THE UN 
GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
3.1 Background of the UN Guiding Principles 
To better understand the significance of the UNGPs to the human rights due diligence 
discourse, a short review of their background is presented. After all, before the appoint-
ment of professor John Ruggie as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
(SRSG) in 2005, there had been several attempts to identify the scope of corporate human 
rights responsibility and, moreover, its nature as a legal obligation. The Global Compact 
launched by the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1999 had not gathered as 
much support as had been hoped and its principles were relevantly vague and flexible.70 
Later, “the train wreck in Geneva”,71 i.e. the miserable failure of the UN Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with re-
gard to Human Rights (UN Norms), resulted in the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) 
not endorsing the UN Norms which would have assigned legal obligation regarding hu-
man rights also to non-state actors, including corporations. Thus, the UN took a new ap-
proach and mandated the SRSG to clarify and elaborate the relationship of state duties 
and corporate responsibilities without establishing binding international obligations or 
changing the current state of international law.72 
The first achievement of Ruggie was the UNHRC’s unanimous approval of the Protect, 
Respect and Remedy Framework (Framework) in 2008. The Framework outlines three 
responsibilities that complement each other: the state duty to protect against human rights 
abuses by third parties, including business; the corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights; and the need for more effective access to remedies. The mandate of the SRSG was 
further continued to operationalize the Framework and he succeed in the given three years 
to present the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which were endorsed 
by the UNHRC in June 2011. The UNGPs are built on the foundation of the Framework, 
and the 31 Principles are divided under the three responsibilities presented in the Frame-
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work, namely being “the State Duty to Protect Human Rights”, “the Corporate Responsi-
bility to Respect Human Rights” and “Access to Remedy”. The relation between the 
Framework and the UNGPs is, as explained by Ruggie, that the Framework addresses the 
“what” and the UNGPs address the “how”.73 
All in all, the UNGPs have received much praise for being “the first authoritative global 
standard for preventing and addressing the risk of adverse impacts on human rights linked 
to business activity for the first time”.74 The hard work of the SRSG resulted to the wide 
approval from both governments and corporate world, and, despite the improvements that 
are suggested later, the UNGPs undoubtedly represent a huge improvement from previous 
attempts to identify the standards of corporate responsibility for human rights. 
3.2 Corporate Responsibility to Respect and HRDD in the UNGPs 
Contrary to the state’s duty to protect, the UNGPs address corporations’ obligations 
through the term responsibility. The different wording is intentional, since the UNGPs 
want to highlight the prevailing doctrine that international law imposes direct obligations 
onto states, not corporations.75 The UNGPs also reserve the term violation for states, 
whilst risks and impacts are used in connection with corporate actions. This further em-
phasizes that UNGPs do not wish to diminish any of the state’s duties, but the corporate 
responsibilities exist separately from the legal duties of the state.76 
The corporate responsibility presented in the UN Guiding Principles 11-21 encompasses 
two areas: negative and positive responsibility. The starting point is that corporations 
should respect human rights, i.e. they have a negative responsibility to avoid infringing 
on the human rights of others.77 However, abstaining from doing harm is not sufficient. 
The positive responsibility is emphasized in the UNGPs and most of the principles re-
garding corporate responsibility are devoted to the requirement for corporations to have 
in place policies and processes, i.e. human rights due diligence, in order to meet their 
responsibility.78 In addition, the UNGPs go even further and require that corporations 
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“seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their 
operations, products or services by their business relationships, even if they have not con-
tributed to those impacts”.79 Thus, corporations’ positive responsibility regarding due dil-
igence is also extended in certain situation to the actions of third parties, such as subsidi-
aries and suppliers, with whom the corporations are connected. 
Despite HRDD’s centrality to the UNGPs, it is not defined in the Principles. Principle 15 
only provides that the policies and processes that the corporations should have in place 
include “a human rights due diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and account 
for how they address their impacts on human rights”.80 Furthermore, Principle 17, the key 
principle regarding HRDD, states that human rights due diligence process should include 
“assessing actual and potential human rights impacts, integrating and acting upon the 
findings, tracking responses, and communicating how impacts are addressed”.81 Later, 
these two principles were put together in the UN Guiding Principles Reporting Frame-
work’s (Reporting Framework), that was introduced to provide guidance for corporations 
to report on how they respect human rights, definition of HRDD: 
“[Human rights due diligence is] an ongoing risk management process that a reasonable 
and prudent company needs to follow in order to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for 
how it addresses its adverse human rights impacts. It includes four key steps: assessing 
actual and potential human rights impacts; integrating and acting on the findings; tracking 
responses; and communicating about how impacts are addressed.”82 
Thus, the concept is defined through the actual steps that companies are required to take. 
More precise definition might not even be feasible, since the scope of HRDD that is ex-
pected of a corporations is context specific.83 Even though the UNGPs apply to corpora-
tions regardless of their size, sector, operational context, ownership and structure, the 
scope of the HRDD depends on these factors, 84 as well as on the risk of severe human 
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rights impacts.85 Furthermore, it is recognized that the scope of HRDD may change over 
time since the business operations of a corporation may evolve.86 
Therefore, to understand what is expected of companies regarding HRDD, focus is shifted 
on the process of HRDD presented in the UNGPs. Principles 18-21 elaborate HRDD’s 
essential components: analyzing human rights impacts and consulting stakeholders (Prin-
ciple 18), addressing and mitigating adverse impacts with appropriate actions (Principle 
19), tracking the response to the impacts (Principle 20), and communicating to stakehold-
ers how the impacts have been addressed (Principle 21). The commentaries of these prin-
ciples provide corporations valuable insight on how to comply with them. Furthermore, 
a separate Interpretive Guide on the Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights 
(Interpretive Guide) gives “additional background explanations to the Guiding Principles 
to support the full understanding of their meaning and intent”.87 In practice, as listed by 
Robert McCorquadale and others, human rights due diligence has been identified to in-
clude, for example, the following components: 
• ”initial identification through human rights impact assessment, desktop research or 
gap analysis, perhaps followed or complemented by interviews; 
• assessment of human rights risks, including risks to rights-holders; 
• prioritization of human rights issues; 
• development of action plans; 
• strategic direction at the board level; 
• cross-functionality: steering groups, working groups, interaction between relevant 
functions; 
• integration of human rights into internal compliance mechanisms, scoring and 
tools; 
• translation and application of human rights to apply to each function; 
• inclusion of HRDD requirements in contractual provisions; 
• having codes of conduct and operational policies; 
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• providing training to employees (and in some cases to other stakeholders); and 
• ensuring that there are effective grievance mechanisms.”88 
Although the above-mentioned components are applied very differently within each cor-
poration, the approach to HRDD has been found to be surprisingly similar across different 
sectors and corporate structures.89 This further emphasizes the meaning of HRDD as a 
tool that brings together the human rights and corporate world. 
Furthermore, HRDD presented in the UNGPs is in line with the prevailing doctrine that 
separates international obligations between states and non-state actors.90 When corpora-
tions are asked to have in place human rights due diligence policies and processes, the 
UNGPs on the other hand ask states to “provide effective guidance to business enterprises 
on how to respect human rights throughout their operations” as part of the state’s duty to 
protect human rights.91 This is further elaborated in the commentary to mean that states 
should “advise on appropriate methods, including human rights due diligence”.92 States 
have, even before the UNGPs but more so after them, started to regulate HRDD in their 
national laws. In practice, this has taken place by states implementing National Action 
Plans (NAPs) as encouraged by the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights 
(UNWG).93 NAPs are hoped to, among others, include provisions that state the need for 
corporations to respect human rights in line with the UNGPs, such as implementing hu-
man rights due diligence policies and processes.94 HRDD actually is the only obligation 
in the sphere of business and human rights that may be found both in the domestic regu-
lations and in the international mechanisms.95 Therefore, it seems evident that HRDD 
will continue to develop both nationally and internationally as the most promising tool to 
involve corporations in the protection of human rights. 
Undoubtedly, the UNGPs have earned their praise regarding enhancement of business 
and human rights especially by properly bringing the human rights due diligence on the 
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international and national tables. Nevertheless, the UNGPs remain merely voluntary prin-
ciples, and a clear decision was made not to establish binding international obligations to 
corporations and, consequently, not to change the current state of international law. This 
leaves room for critique and questions whether the UNGPs are a sufficient international 
source for the protection of human rights from corporate violations or whether there is a 
need for a binding international treaty to regulate business and human rights. Therefore, 
the strengths and weaknesses of regulating HRDD through the UNGPs are assessed next. 
3.3 Strengths and Weaknesses of Regulating HRDD through the UNGPs 
3.3.1 Strengths of the UNGPs 
The UNGPs have received great success among governments and corporations. They 
managed to create innovative and new approach to business and human rights but at the 
same time they rely on existing structures and regulation. This made them less dramatic 
and controversial compared to, for example, the UN Norms. Their wide approval did not 
turn up from nothing, but several factors explain their strength. 
First of all, at a general level, non-legally binding international law instruments have cer-
tain advantages. They are often flexible as states do not need to go through a ratification 
process unlike with treaties. Also, states may more easily find consensus on the voluntary 
instrument’s content as well as agree on more detailed provisions, since the consequences 
of non-compliance with such instruments are very limited.96 Thus, voluntary instruments 
may encourage unanimous approval when the states do not feel that their sovereignty is 
threatened. 
One of the reasons why specifically the UNGPs succeeded as a non-legally binding in-
ternational law instrument, was that Ruggie emphasized the importance of including all 
stakeholders in the process and he conducted international consultations around the world 
to achieve consensus between states and corporations.97 The consultations included four-
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teen multi-stakeholder consultations on five continents as well as two dozen research pro-
jects that produced over a thousand pages of documentation.98 Ruggie’s thorough re-
search helped him understand the complex business world, which further resulted in at-
taining the approval of corporate actors to the UNGPs. The UNGPs highlight that one-
size does not fit all and take into account the special characteristics of corporations. This 
is done, for example, by addressing the corporate responsibility not only with human 
rights language but also business language, such as due diligence. 
It is also highly positive that the UNGPs do not limit their application to a certain type of 
corporations but apply to all corporations regardless of their size and other indicators.99 
The responsibility to respect human rights applies fully and equally to all corporations.100 
Therefore, the UNGPs have importantly noticed that also small and medium-sized corpo-
rations may have severe human rights impacts. Naturally, the scale of the means through 
which corporations meet their responsibilities, such as the scope of the human rights due 
diligence, needs to be proportional to individual factors, such as size and scope of human 
rights impacts, but the starting point is that all corporations need to take into account the 
possible consequences of their actions to human rights. 
By bringing together the corporate law and human rights law, the greatest strength of the 
UNGPs is, thus, their contribution to the development of the new norm that corporations 
should respect human rights and be responsible for the impacts of their actions.101 The 
public debate on the matter has supported the calls for companies to act in accordance 
with the principles. Therefore, even without a judicial compulsion, some of the corpora-
tions have taken measures to implement human rights due diligence to assess their human 
rights impacts. The emphasis on the demands of surrounding society is understandable in 
light of the fact that the UNGPs did not wish to change the current situation where there 
are not direct international legal obligations for corporations regarding businesses and 
human rights. In fact, looking already at the Interim Report of the SRSG from 2006, the 
basis for corporate responsibility has been built on the social expectations towards busi-
nesses: “companies are constrained not only by legal standards but also by social norms 
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and moral considerations”, and also by “what their internal and external stakeholders ex-
pect of them”.102 This notion continued all the way to the final versions of the Framework 
and the UNGPs, which state that corporations must respect human rights because it is the 
prerequisite to continue their social license to operate.103 
3.3.2 Weaknesses of the UNGPs 
3.3.2.1 Abstract Standards and Fabricated Consensus 
To begin the conversation of the weaknesses of the UNGPs, I will continue where I left 
with their strengths. There is an evident problem in the fact that the UNGPs solely base 
the corporate responsibility on social expectations without any actual interference from 
legislation, since rights based on expectations may not be demanded by the right-holders 
nor may there exist remedies for rights without legal force.104 This has also been noted 
by David Bilchitz, who says that the UNGPs may not simultaneously refer to human 
rights instruments as a source of social expectations and deny their legally binding na-
ture.105 Bilchitz continues with an important notion that even if it was acceptable to base 
the human rights obligations of corporations merely on social exceptions, it is impossible 
to determine what social expectations require in the globalized world that has competing 
interests and ideologies.106 Abstract standards need to be linked with concrete contexts or 
otherwise the concrete meaning of human rights protection required from corporations is 
weakened significantly. 
The abstract nature of also other standards and terms in the UNGPs poses further prob-
lems. Even though the UNGPs were praised for bringing together the business and human 
rights in a way not seen before, they failed to define terms that were used and left varieties 
of issues untouched. Therefore, uncertainty remains on both sides of the table since, when 
not clearly defined, the important terms of human rights may be unfamiliar to corpora-
tions and, likewise, the complex corporate world terms may not open up for human rights 
policy makers.107 For example, as was already stated before, the UNGPs heavily lean on 
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human rights due diligence but they do not define the concept. Furthermore, even if a 
legislative text needs to keep a level of abstraction, it still needs to provide reasonable 
answers to the core questions it handles. The UNGPs do not succeed in this by leaving 
the true content of, for example, “appropriate steps” and “appropriate action” regarding 
the regulation of corporate activity unelaborated.108 
In addition, the alleged wide consensus of the UNGPs does not appear to be so wide when 
examined more carefully. Especially some of the non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) have presented severe doubts about the UNGPs. The Human Rights Watch has 
criticized the way the UNGPs merely remain the status quo, because it upholds “a world 
where companies are encouraged, but not obliged, to respect human rights”.109 Also, the 
greatest worry of the NGOs has been the lack of effective remedies for victims and the 
difficulties regarding state obligation to prevent violations committed by corporations 
outside their territory.110 Surya Deva has raised the concern that, despite Ruggie’s exten-
sive consultations, the SRSG did not, in the end, let all stakeholders’ opinions have an 
impact on the outcome of the UNGPs, the core of which was actually determined before-
hand for the preponderant part by the SRSG and his mandate.111 It seems that, in order to 
satisfy the business sector, some of the more controversial aspects of the debate were left 
unaddressed and the SRSG took the differences expressed by corporations much more 
seriously than the ones presented by less powerful actors, such as some of the NGOs.112 
Thus, it was deemed more important to enhance the generally settled consensus on the 
state duty of protection and corporate responsibility to respect human rights instead of 
trying to offer recommendations on more controversial issues such as assessing corpora-
tions as duty-bearers. 
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Similarly, the alleged wide consensus on states’ side leaves room for doubts. Even though 
the UNGPs were unanimously endorsed by the Human Rights Council, for example Ec-
uador presented serious concerns and stressed the need of binding measures.113 However, 
these comments were not included in the final text and, likewise in connection with some 
of the comments of the NGOs, it seems that the idea of consensus, even a fabricated one, 
was more important than seriously express the presented concerns. In addition, the sup-
port of the states for the UNGPs has not been realized in concrete acts very well. Since 
the UNGPs heavily lean on the state as the obligor, they must be properly implemented 
in the national legislations of the states in order for them to have a true effect. However, 
there has been a rather low turnout of the aforementioned National Action Plans that were 
hoped to strengthen the states’ commitment towards the UNGPs,114 and the NAPs which 
have been published are mostly declaratory in nature and do not provide concrete new 
actions.115 The examples of some of the most successful NAPs include national due dili-
gence laws, some of which regulate due diligence as the background tool for a mandatory 
reporting requirement and some of which have due diligence as the main focus further 
including then some additional reporting obligations.116 Also, some of the national due 
diligence responsibilities relate to a specific human rights problem, such as child labor.117 
However, many of the requirements are rather vague and general as well as fail to regulate 
the actual process of human rights due diligence, which may lead to problems in the in-
terpretation of these laws. Furthermore, national due diligence legislations that pose man-
datory obligations on corporations are still rare and, as already demonstrated earlier in 
this thesis, adhering to national laws does not guarantee that international human rights 
law is respected by corporations, because human rights laws, let alone the UN Guiding 
Principles, are not adopted into domestic laws everywhere in the world. 
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3.3.2.2 Omission of Extraterritorial State Obligations and Parent Company Liability in 
the Supply Chain 
Although not the central focus of this thesis, the omission of extraterritorial state obliga-
tions is connected to many of the weaknesses presented above and, thus, requires some 
more in-depth analysis since it is one of the most pressing defects of the UNGPs that 
requires to be responded to in the future. Corporations may with ever-increasing easiness 
spread their activities worldwide due to globalization and digitalization, and the question 
of extraterritoriality concerns especially multinational corporations which have found 
themselves in a selection of jurisdictions. Consequently, this leads to a situation where 
corporations more and more have impacts on human rights across the borders of their 
home state. 
The starting point of the issue is that, as a default rule, the doctrine of state sovereignty 
prohibits states from extraterritoriality regulating multinational corporations over state 
borders. As the SRSG did not wish to change the prevailing state of international law, this 
notion remained as the basis of the UNGPs. The commentary of Principle two states that 
“at present States are not generally required under international human rights law to reg-
ulate the extraterritorial activities of businesses domiciled in their territory and/or juris-
diction”.118 Therefore, the UNGPs do not compel states to truly adopt extraterritoriality, 
and affirm the voluntarism of the UNGPs even towards states when they do not require 
states to regulate corporate behavior abroad. 
The lack of enforcing extraterritorial state obligations leaves one of the biggest issues of 
business and human rights unresolved, namely the key problem of the protection of hu-
man rights in countries where the state is unable or unwilling to regulate and enforce 
human rights. Thus, the lack of extraterritorial state obligations is also related to the worry 
regarding the lack of sanctions and enforcement mechanisms, since the UNGPs do not 
have an effective enforcement mechanism leaving them non-enforceable on the interna-
tional level. The UNGPs vaguely try to address the situation by asking the corporation to 
“seek ways to honor the principles of internationally recognized human rights when faced 
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with conflicting requirements”.119 The commentary further states that “all business enter-
prises have the same responsibility to respect human rights wherever they operate”.120 
However, even putting aside the voluntary nature of the Principles, the obligation severely 
loses its teeth by merely asking the corporations to seek ways to honor and not directly 
honor human rights in such conflicting situations, for example having in place human 
rights due diligence process even though their host state would not require one. 
Consequently, corporations are not addressed as duty-bearers in the UNGPs. Because of 
this, the parent companies also have a limited liability in connection with their subsidiar-
ies and supply chains where the human rights violations occur more often and more seri-
ously even though the UNGPs technically ask corporations to prevent also human rights 
impacts that are linked to them even if they have not contributed to those impacts.121 In 
fact, also the commentary of Principle 19 admits that situations, where an adverse human 
rights impact is linked to corporation’s operations, products or services via its business 
relationship with another entity without the contribution of the corporation, are more com-
plex and there a multiple challenged especially when the business relationship is crucial 
to the corporation.122 The alarming notion in this regard is that, similarly as with the “cor-
porate responsibility to respect”, a failure to carry out HRDD does not entail any legal 
responsibility for the corporation. This means that when international law does not hold 
a parent company liable for human rights abuses of their subsidiaries, the domestic law 
will most likely determine where the liability rests.123 However, many subsidiaries, espe-
cially the ones in extractive and natural resource industries where there is a chance of 
high risk for human rights abuses, are located in developing countries with potentially 
weak rule of law systems, which leads us back to the problem regarding lack of will or 
resources to hold corporations responsible for human rights violations.124 All in all, the 
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term due diligence suggests a legal standard in the UNGPs but remains fundamentally a 
series of good practices without clear legal implications.125 
3.4 Interim Concluding Observations 
It appears that human rights due diligence is gathering consensus among states and cor-
porations as a tool to regulate business and human rights. However, both the due diligence 
principle of the UNGPs and the national due diligence laws leave a level of uncertainty 
which leads to problems regarding their interpretation. Furthermore, the UNGPs have 
serious weaknesses which culminate in the notion that they heavily lean on the state duty 
to protect without actually requiring that states put in place extraterritorial obligations on 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights – let alone formulating the legal status of 
corporations as duty-bearers. The competition across national borders driven by globali-
zation and digitalization creates even greater gaps between the operational capacities of 
multinational corporations and the regulatory capacities of the states. This emphasizes the 
need for international solutions since there are states who lack the means or will to regu-
late nationally corporate responsibility. 
The current atmosphere of strong nationalism makes the enhancing of extraterritorial state 
obligations hard. The United Kingdom’s “Brexit” and president Trump with his slogan 
“Make America Great Again” are pointed examples of the phenomena that is seen in 
many countries as the raise of populist and nationalist parties.  However, extending the 
existing obligations of states to regulate and control corporations beyond their own bor-
ders is not the only way to ensure the liability of globally operating multinational entities. 
Such liability can be ensured by directly imposing legal human rights obligations on cor-
porations.126 This option was discarded by the SRSG because the UNGPs wanted to part 
clearly from the UN Norms that had failed to be adopted. However, especially the NGOs 
presented the need to oblige, not only encourage, the corporations to respect human rights. 
In practice, this means that the positive obligation for corporations to have in place a 
human rights due diligence process needs to be strengthened. 
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This need is at the moment being addressed by the open-ended intergovernmental work-
ing group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to 
human rights (OEIGWG) that is in the middle of the process of drafting a legally binding 
instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises (hereinafter referred to as the “proposed 
treaty” or the “binding treaty”). The next chapter will focus on the proposed treaty and I 
will analyze if it could answer to the worries presented about the UNGPs. It is important 
to emphasize that international soft law and mandatory international law are not in con-
flict and drafting this treaty would by no means make the work achieved in the UNGPs 
vain. On the contrary, the international community has a common goal to enhance the 
corporate responsibility for their human rights impacts, and the different instruments 
should complement each other to achieve the goal. 
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4 MANDATORY HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE THROUGH THE 
PROPOSED TREATY 
4.1 Background and Process of the Proposed Treaty 
 
June 2011 The UNGPs were adopted unanimously by the 
UNHRC 
September 2013 Ecuador called for a new binding treaty to be 
negotiated 
June 2014 Ecuador’s resolution on a binding treaty was 
adopted in the UNHRC 
October 2015 
 
The first session of the OEIGWG 
October 2016 
 
The second session of the OEIGWG 
September 2017 The Elements for the Draft Legally Binding 
Instrument on Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises with Respect to 
Human Rights 
October 2017 
 
The third session of the OEIGWG 
July 2018 
 
Zero Draft of the Legally Binding Instrument 
October 2018 
 
The fourth session of the OEIGWG 
July 2019 Revised Draft of the Legally Binding Instru-
ment 
October 2019 
 
The fifth session of the OEIGWG 
February 2020 Written comments of the Revised Draft were 
invited to be submitted until the end of Febru-
ary 2020 
Table 1. To summarize the process of the proposed treaty so far, the timeline above presents the events 
relating to the binding treaty initiative.127 
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Although the UNGPs had formally been adopted unanimously, dissatisfaction with the 
level of responsibility they required from corporations remained at least among some of 
the states and NGOs. Ecuador was one of the countries that most vocally presented their 
concern about the non-binding nature of the UNGPs, but their comments were not in-
cluded in the final text.128 Thus, it most likely did not come as a surprise when the repre-
sentatives of Ecuador made a declaration regarding transnational corporations and human 
rights at the UNHRC already in 2013, only two years after the UNGPs had been 
adopted.129 Ecuador proposed the creation of an open-ended intergovernmental working 
group (i.e. the OEIGWG) with the mandate to elaborate an international legally binding 
instrument on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to 
human rights. Ecuador received support from South Africa and together, with the signa-
tures from them as well as Bolivia, Cuba and Venezuela, they tabled their resolution with 
the UNHRC in June 2014. A few days later in the same month, the resolution 26/9 was 
adopted by the UNHRC and the OEIGWG was established. The resolution did not receive 
unanimous support but passed by twenty votes to fourteen, with thirteen states abstaining 
from the vote. 
The rejection of the resolution by many of the industrialized members did not bode the 
easiest start for the OEIGWG’s work. Perhaps the most dramatic setback of the first ses-
sion held in October 2015 was the interruption caused by the EU delegation’s objections. 
The first session was stalled for several hours due to informal consultations regarding the 
EU delegation’s proposals that “(i) there should be an additional panel entitled, ‘Imple-
mentation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: A Renewed 
Commitment by All States’, and (ii) ‘TNCs [transnational corporations] and other busi-
ness enterprises’ should be changed to ‘TNCs and all other business enterprises’ in the 
text of the program of work”.130 It remains unclear whether the EU delegation wished to 
interrupt the proceedings or merely wanted to highlight some of the complex issues 
around the topic.131 Even though their request for the new panel was approved, the EU 
delegation did not join the remainder of the first session because the proposed amendment 
to the wording was not made. However, by the second session in October 2016, the EU 
                                                 
128 See Mauricio Montalvo’s comment at supra note 108. 
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131 Heasman 2018, p. 103. 
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had a more cooperative stance and participated in the negotiations again. The reasons for 
the critical viewpoint of the EU as well as other resisting stakeholders are presented in 
more detail later. 
After the OEIGWG had been concentrating for the first two sessions on “conducting con-
structive deliberations on the content, scope, nature and form of a future international 
instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises”,132 the third session held in October 2017 
took into consideration these discussions and focused further on the Elements for the 
Draft Legally Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business En-
terprises with Respect to Human Rights (Elements) that had been published by the chair-
man of the OEIGWG in September 2017. Based on the Elements and all the discussions 
in the first three sessions as well as several consultations and more than 100 bilateral 
meetings with multiple stakeholders,133 the Zero Draft of the Legally Binding Instrument 
to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corpo-
rations and Other Business Enterprises (Zero Draft) was published in July 2018. Further-
more, the Zero Draft was the main subject of the fourth session in October 2018. The 
session was very productive, and along with the previous sessions, enabled the prepara-
tion of the Revised Draft of the Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International 
Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business En-
terprises (Revised Draft). The Revised Draft was published in July 2019 and it was the 
subject of the fifth session of the OEIGWG held in October 2019. States and all other 
relevant stakeholders were invited to submit their additional textual suggestions on the 
Revised Draft by the end of February 2020, and the new decade brings along high hopes 
for the proposed treaty. 
4.2 The Role and Scope of HRDD in the Proposed Treaty 
As the process of the proposed treaty is still on-going, the following analysis must be 
based on the documentation available at the time of writing this thesis: the Revised Draft 
and the documents and discussions leading to it, i.e. the Zero Draft and the Elements as 
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well as the sessions of the OEIGW and the expert opinions related thereto. A dominant 
feature of the treaty process has been the vast multiplicity of the issues from which the 
drafters of the treaty should select the most relevant to the final treaty.134 Similarly as 
with the UNGPs, the obligation for corporations to demonstrate human rights due dili-
gence is one of the main points that has been proposed to be included in the treaty along 
with remedial mechanisms.135 Addressing HRDD as one of the main tools of also the 
proposed treaty highlights its importance in the regulation of business and human rights. 
Thus, it is justified to further direct the focus to the role that HRDD would have in the 
proposed treaty. 
The obligation of HRDD has been developing throughout the treaty process. Already in 
the first session of the OEIGWG, various NGOs stressed the importance of having man-
datory due diligence requirement for corporations, which would include prevention, mit-
igation and redress for negative human rights impacts.136 It was also recognized that better 
access to remedy is the prerequisite for human rights protection, and collaboration on due 
diligence investigations and enforcement of judgements is needed.137 
To further elaborate how the proposed treaty could address human rights due diligence, a 
briefing paper for consultation on the subject was prepared by Robert McCorquodale and 
Marcos Orellana before the second meeting of the OEIGWG. The briefing paper suggests 
some of the processes and procedures that could be included in the proposed treaty. One 
option for the possible treaty provision regarding the concept of HRDD included a refer-
ence to the UNGPs: “In the treaty, it could be stated that all human rights due diligence 
should be conducted according to, at minimum, the international standards of the Guiding 
Principles.”138 Other option presented the requirement of due diligence in all business 
contracts and the responsibility of the contracting party for active monitoring.139 How-
ever, the actual concept of HRDD is suggested to be left open to interpretation through 
case law and legislation due to the context specific nature of HRDD. Furthermore, the 
briefing paper provides options for a provision related to the elements of human rights 
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due diligence. States should focus on providing clear obligations that require corporations 
to put in place HRDD, for example, at key stages, such as in connection with changed 
activities, or on an annual basis at least.140 The briefing paper also highlights the require-
ment for free and informed consultation with stakeholders, especially including local 
communities, and the need for legal consequences when a corporation fails to comply 
with HRDD obligations.141 
In the second session of the OEIGWG, most of the delegations agreed that voluntary 
standards are insufficient, and a binding instrument should set out direct obligations and 
responsibilities for corporations as well as clarify the steps that corporations should take 
in that regard.142 The importance of establishing a mechanism to evaluate corporate 
HRDD was highlighted, so that no loopholes would be left for corporations to escape 
their responsibility.143 
Taking into account the discussions on the two first sessions as well as the expert opin-
ions, such as the aforementioned briefing paper, the Elements further outlined the obliga-
tion of human rights due diligence. The Elements placed HRDD under the headline of 
“Preventive Measures” and introduced HRDD as “different policies, processes and 
measures that [corporations] need to undertake, as a minimum prudence, according to its 
capacities, to meet its responsibility to respect human rights”.144 Furthermore, “[i]n this 
regard, the real added value of this section would be precisely to give a legally binding 
nature to the adoption of such measures or minimum standards by [corporation]”.145 To 
answer to the requests regarding concrete and clear guidance on HRDD, the section also 
listed examples of what the due diligence procedure should include: 
• “a risk assessment of human rights violations or abuses in order to facilitate their 
identification and analysis; 
• a procedure of periodic evaluation of subsidiary enterprises throughout the supply 
chain in relation to their respect of human rights; 
• actions aimed at risk reduction; 
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• an early warning system; 
• a set of specific actions to immediately redress such violations or abuses; and 
• a follow up mechanism of its implementation, notwithstanding other legal proce-
dures.”146 
 
The Elements document was the focus of the third session of the OEIGWG, where many 
delegations welcomed the provision that required corporations to adopt and implement 
due diligence policies and processes.147 Furthermore, it was suggested in the session that 
the provision shall ensure that states implement uniform, minimum standards. Some con-
cerns were raised that this would allow states to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction im-
properly, but the chairman Guillaume Long clarified that the due diligence is intended to 
oblige the parent corporation domiciled in a state and that it is the parent corporation’s 
obligation then to assess risks throughout its supply chain.148 This is an important notion 
that should reassure the states fearing to lose their sovereignty should extraterritorial ju-
risdiction be expanded. In addition, this explanation takes into account the specific char-
acter of corporations and does not let them hide behind the corporate structure; even 
though every company in a group forms their own entity, the parent company has the 
obligation to extend the due diligence throughout its subsidiaries and supply chain. Trans-
parent human rights due diligence processes in every part of the supply chain enhances 
also the consumers access to information that they need to influence business habits.149 
All the previous work of the OEIGWG and the stakeholders led to including the human 
rights due diligence in the Zero Draft’s Article 9 titled “Prevention”. In the fourth session 
of the OEIGWG, the Article 9 was praised to be one of the key articles of the Zero Draft 
and its focus on prevention was complimented.150 However, several improvements to the 
Article 9 were also suggested. As also discussed previously in this thesis, corporate due 
diligence and human rights due diligence differ greatly, and thus it was emphasized that 
the Article 9 should consistently refer to human rights due diligence rather than due dili-
gence alone to avoid any misunderstandings.151 Furthermore, many delegations suggested 
                                                 
146 The Elements 2017, p. 7. 
147 Report of the third session 2018, paragraph 78. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Report of the third session 2018, paragraph 37. 
150 Report of the fourth session 2019, paragraphs 9, 11, 17, 55, 57. 
151 Report of the fourth session 2019, paragraphs 11, 55. 
39 
 
that the Article 9 should be aligned more closely with the UNGPs, especially so that it 
covers both national and multinational corporations.152 Also, contrary views were pre-
sented regarding the precision of the Article 9, and especially the unexhaustive list what 
due diligence should include. Some argued that each state should be let to determine how 
to best implement the provision, and that it would be more effective if it outlined general 
standards. Others, including several delegations and NGOs, insisted that even more pre-
cision was needed in the text of the provision.153 Also the overburdening of corporations 
with administrative obligations in connection with human rights due diligence was on the 
table. The conversation regarding this aspect revolved around the Article 9(5) which 
would grant states the possibility to exempt certain small and medium-sized corporations 
from selected obligations of the provision. Since there is no accepted universal definition 
of small and medium-sized undertakings, the provision was argued to leave too much in 
the discretion of states and severely weaken the provision.154 
Exactly one year after the Zero Draft was published, the chairman of the OEIGWG re-
leased the Revised Draft on 16 July 2019. The provision regarding human rights due dil-
igence was relocated in Article 5, though the title remained “Prevention”. At this point, it 
is rather safe to say that the preventive nature shall be the key component of the provision 
on HRDD in the proposed treaty because it was further emphasized in the fifth session of 
OEIGWG that “preventing harm in the first place was preferable to attempting to remedy 
it after the fact”.155 Furthermore, also the experts underlined the need for companies to 
take proactive actions when conducting human rights due diligence in order to prevent 
human rights violations.156 The wording of the Article 5 was amended accordingly to 
focus more on the conduct than the outcomes.157 This notion is also emphasized with 
adding the requirement of meaningful consultations with affected groups to the HRDD 
measures to be taken, something which was not directly linked in the HRDD steps of the 
UNGPs.158 
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However, other concerns regarding the article remained mainly the same. The delegations 
were still divided into those who thought the open-ended list of the measures, which hu-
man rights due diligence should as a minimum standard include, was too prescriptive and 
those who thought it to be too vague.159 Also, the article still included some ambiguous 
concepts, such as the “contractual relationships”, that were suggested to be changed, in 
the case of the example to “business relationships”, so that the scope of protection would 
be increased and that the provision would be more in line with the UNGPs.160 On the 
other hand, experts praised the inclusion of paragraph 5, which recognizes the issue of 
undue corporate influence, as well as the removal of exemptions regarding small and me-
dium-sized enterprises in paragraph 6.161 
To conclude, the article regarding human rights due diligence is in the center of the dis-
cussions on the proposed treaty. It is important to notice that the article is still subject to 
multiple changes and the whole proposed treaty is expected to go through many more 
draft rounds before its final form. Opposing views remain regarding the content and es-
pecially the precision of the article, and the OEIGWG has a difficult task to settle the 
differences. Some of the biggest issues that prevail are the scope of the corporations and 
business activities that the proposed treaty covers as well as the level of defence that 
corporations could acquire based upon showing human rights due diligence. I will pay 
special attention to these issues on the next chapter when analyzing the praise and critique 
that the proposed treaty has received. 
4.3 Praise and Critique of the Proposed Treaty 
4.3.1 Support for a Binding International Treaty to Complement the UNGPs 
Before moving on to more in-depth analysis on the proposed treaty, a few general remarks 
ought to be presented first. Already at this point of the treaty process, the fear that the 
proposed treaty would completely sideline the UNGPs has proven to be unjustified.162 
The OEIGWG took into account the comments asking for better compatibility with the 
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UNGPs, and the Revised Draft includes an explicit reference to the UNGPs in the pream-
ble.163 Also, the Deputy High Commissioner emphasized in her opening statement in the 
OEIGWG’s fifth session that “the treaty process should not be used to undermine or stop 
action on the implementation of the UNGPs, at least until such time as a stronger norma-
tive framework is in place”.164 
Even though international soft law instruments, such as the UNGPs, have certain 
strengths,165 there are clear advantages in complementing them with the “stronger nor-
mative framework”. In contrast to the current international soft-law regulative field, the 
most obvious positive impacts of a proposed treaty would include answering to problems 
related to the enforcement, remedies and overall compliance with human rights norms.166 
The International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP) has highlighted the follow-
ing advantages of hard law, and especially international hard law, in relation to corpora-
tions and human rights. Firstly, hard law instruments have the efficiency that the volun-
tary norms lack due to their voluntary nature, and create means to ensure that to corpora-
tions act accordingly.167 Secondly, the increasing amount of corporations with transna-
tional activities requires them to be regulated at international level since their growing 
powers exceed the ability of individual states to regulate them effectively.168 Furthermore, 
it may be granted that soft law can be helpful in the beginning of the drafting process of 
a proposed treaty in creating consensus among different actors. However, especially when 
creating entirely new obligations or otherwise establishing significant changes in interna-
tional legal order, such as the human rights duties on companies, soft law is not sufficient 
regulation on its own, but the new rules require the binding force of a treaty.169 
Throughout the treaty process, several delegations have emphasized the need for interna-
tional legal developments in the session of the OEIGWG.170 The supporting parties have 
cited several objectives of the proposed treaty, among others the following: 
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• “increasing legal certainty and predictability to help ensure a level playing field; 
• enhancing prevention and mitigation of business-related human rights abuse; 
• improving access to remedy for those harmed; 
• closing existing gaps in protection and international law; and 
• increasing coordination amongst members of the international community.”171 
The prevailing question that follows these objectives is whether the proposed treaty has 
the means to achieve these goals and, most importantly, close the gaps that remained after 
implementing the UNGPs. The proposed treaty did not receive unanimous support right 
from the start, and many predicted in the beginning of the process that the proposed treaty 
may face the same destiny as the UN Norms. However, the further the process continues, 
the more positive the participants have become about finding a consensus. The work is 
not done yet, but the direction is right. Thus, the following analysis is concentrated in 
addressing the most pressing issues the proposed treaty has to assess, with special em-
phasis on the matters that are most connected with corporations’ obligation to have 
HRDD in place. 
4.3.2 Scope of Corporations Covered by the Proposed Treaty 
The most controversial point of the debate since the very first session of the OEIGWG 
has been the scope of corporations that the proposed treaty should cover. Even though the 
mandate of the OEIGWG would seem to include also “other business enterprises” in ad-
dition to the transnational corporations, the footnote on the preamble of the resolution 
26/9 has caused unclarity. The footnote states that “’[o]ther business enterprises’ denotes 
all business enterprises that have a transnational character in their operational activities, 
and does not apply to local businesses registered in terms of relevant domestic law”.172 
Thus, presumably to gain enough votes to pass, the footnote in the resolution narrowed 
the scope of corporations only to those with business activities of transnational charac-
ter.173 
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The exclusion of local corporations was one of the main reasons why the EU and also 
representatives from many industrial states were first reluctant to support the treaty pro-
cess. Especially the EU was very determined to ensure that the scope of the proposed 
treaty should not be limited to transnational corporations, and it proposed to add the word 
“all” before “other business enterprises” in the beginning of the first session of the 
OEIGWG but the proposal did not receive sufficient support.174 Those opposing said that 
the EU’s suggestion would change the mandate of the OEIGWG, and some argued that 
an international treaty that regulated purely domestic companies would infringe states’ 
sovereignty.175 Additionally, some states claimed that only multinational corporations 
should be regulated at international level since they may use complex corporate structures 
to hide in different jurisdictions but domestic corporations are always subject to local 
laws.176 
However, these arguments have several shortcomings and the development of the pro-
posed treaty has shown signs of including both domestic and international corporations 
into the scope of the treaty. Both the corporations and the NGOs have agreed that the 
treaty should cover both multinational and domestic corporations, although their reasons 
differ to some extent. The most obvious reason why the argument that only multinational 
corporations should be covered by international treaty and domestic law should regulate 
domestic corporations is weak is the fact, which has been repeated also in this thesis many 
times, that many states lack the will or capacity to regulate business and human rights 
domestically. Many human rights abuses are committed by corporations at the domestic 
level and the strengthening of the protection of human rights throughout global supply 
chains requires a wide scope of application.177 If the proposed treaty excluded domestic 
corporations, it would create an absurd situation where e.g. local clothing factory owners 
would not be held responsible for infringing workers’ rights but the multinational garment 
purchasing corporations would.178 Furthermore, corporate structures may be easily struc-
tured as acting through locally incorporated subsidiaries which would enable corporations 
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to avoid falling within the scope of the proposed treaty if its scope remained limited. What 
is even more important, the victims of human rights infringements do not care and often 
even do not know whether they are harmed by a multinational or domestic corporation.179 
Thus, the focus should be in ensuring that all corporations have adequate processes in 
place in order to identify and prevent human rights abuses in their activities, whether with 
transnational or local character. 
The EU, as well as many industrial states and corporations agree to a great extent with 
the above-mentioned arguments in favor of expanding the scope of the proposed treaty, 
but they have more business-centric reasons for aiming towards the same goal. The EU, 
for example, argued that limiting the scope of the proposed treaty to multinational corpo-
rations would put numerous European corporations operating in third countries at a com-
petitive disadvantage compared to their local competitors, which would not have to com-
ply with the obligations of the proposed treaty.180 Furthermore, the international business 
community commented in their response to the Zero Draft, that should the proposed treaty 
exclude domestic companies, it also excludes state-owned corporations that operate do-
mestically.181 This is especially concerning regarding the ongoing trend towards public-
private partnerships in delivering public services.182 
Therefore, several stakeholders warmly welcomed the expanded scope that the Revised 
Draft brought on the table.183  Perhaps since it was forcefully argued, among others, by 
the International Commission of Jurists, that “a footnote in the preamble could not limit 
the scope of discussion or the outcome of negotiations”,184 the OEIGWG could with con-
fidence widen the scope of corporations covered by the proposed treaty, which had been 
one of the major concerns regarding the Zero Draft. A compromise was reached that the 
application of the treaty is not limited on the transnational activities but applies to all 
business activities with merely special emphasis on the transnational activities. Thus, for 
example, the human rights due diligence requirement applies, according to the Article 
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5(2) of the Revised Draft, to “all persons conducting business activities, including those 
of transnational character”.185 This makes the proposed treaty also more in line with the 
UNGPs. More importantly, taking into account domestic small and medium-sized corpo-
rations as well as state owned corporations, the treaty avoids doing the same mistake that 
the international law has been criticized about: focusing only on the transnational corpo-
rations.186 Nevertheless, even though the explicit exemption of small and medium-sized 
corporations was removed, the Revised Draft recognizes that one-size does not fit all cor-
porations and allows in the Article 5(6) that “States Parties may provide incentives and 
other measures to facilitate compliance with requirements under this Article by small and 
medium sized undertakings conducting business activities to avoid causing undue addi-
tional burdens”. 
4.3.3 Level of Defence for Corporations in the Proposed Treaty 
In corporate law, due diligence reviews are often conducted in order to gain statutory 
defence against civil claims or criminal charges towards the company or corporate offi-
cials.187 To defend itself, the corporation must show that it took all reasonable steps or 
applied the necessary due diligence. However, in connection with human rights due dili-
gence, the starting point has been so far, that HRDD is not meant for corporations to avoid 
liability.188 
Thus, under the prevailing interpretation of international HRDD standards there would 
be no defence available for corporations that have undertaken human rights due diligence. 
The background for choosing this option might be that it prevents corporations hiding 
behind the excuse of not being aware of the actions of third parties, for example their 
subsidiaries or suppliers. However, this may lead some corporations to not undertake 
HRDD in the fear that HRDD process will uncover human rights impacts and violation 
which will make the corporations liable for them.189 On the other hand, Lia Heasman has 
argued that this might not be the case based on the notion that the adverse human rights 
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impacts are hoped to decrease through HRDD since corporations may revise them more 
quickly when they are more aware of them.190 In addition, she gives an example of the 
United States Alien Tort Statute (ATS), where there may be found a connection between 
the lower litigation costs and due diligence, when the corporation has been able to demon-
strate that adequate due diligence has been undertaken and use the HRDD as defence 
against claims under ATS.191 
Nevertheless, without going into detail with the specific problems with the ATS, it is only 
one country’s domestic law and the international HRDD standard still disregards the pos-
sibility of defence in connection with HRDD. Furthermore, the decrease of adverse hu-
man right impacts may not be achieved if the corporation never undertakes HRDD in the 
first place. The current international HRDD standard leans on too heavily on the under-
lying expectation that all corporations want to act ethically, even though amongst them 
are corporations that do not prioritize avoiding adverse human rights impact. Therefore, 
the voluntary nature of HRDD does not benefit either of the parties since it does not give 
the corporations any defence if they have conducted HRDD adequately but at the same 
time it does not oblige corporations to conduct any due diligence which leaves human 
rights impacts unnoticed and victims without remedies. 
Therefore, the proposed treaty should try to balance the mandatory due diligence with a 
level of defence for corporations regarding the action of third parties. There is a difference 
in the responsibilities on a corporation between its own actions causing or contributing to 
adverse human rights impacts and the actions of third parties, where the corporation 
should prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts.192 Thus, as McCorquodale and 
Orellana present in their briefing paper, the proposed treaty “might include a provision 
that allowed a business enterprise that had conducted appropriate human rights due dili-
gence to rely on it as a defence to a claim, though only where a third party has caused 
adverse human rights impacts”.193 Such provision would take into account that it may be 
a too stringent requirement to ask corporation to know all aspects of their complex supply 
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chain. Experts have also suggested that the burden of proof is primarily on to corporation 
but when the corporation has established that it has conducted HRDD, the burden of proof 
should be shifted to the victim to demonstrate that the corporations could have imple-
mented actions that could have prevented the harm.194 Furthermore, the context specific 
nature of HRDD allows the different cases to be evaluated based on how close the rela-
tionship is between the corporation and the third party violating human rights. The closer 
the relationship is, the more HRDD can be required.195 
4.3.4 Directness of Corporate Obligation in the Proposed Treaty 
It should be once again emphasized that the states hold the primary obligation to protect 
human rights. A clear statement regarding this matter was also added to the preamble of 
the Revised Draft, which explicitly stresses that “the primary obligation to respect, pro-
tect, fulfil and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms lie with the State, and 
that States must protect against human rights abuse by third parties, including business 
enterprises”.196 Thus, the feared “responsibility shift”197 is not on the agenda. Throughout 
the process it has been clear that the responsibility of states is not diminished even though 
the proposed treaty would pose direct obligations to corporations to promote human 
rights. 
In the beginning of the treaty process, the Elements proposed direct obligations on cor-
porations. However, this was deemed to be too controversial by many stakeholders, es-
pecially states, since corporations do not have an established position as subjects of inter-
national public law. Consequently, already in the Zero Draft the OEIGWG chose the tra-
ditional international law pathway and did no longer stipulate direct obligations for cor-
porations but emphasizes that only states have legal obligations to make corporations le-
gally accountable. Thus, also the Article 5 of the Revised Draft regarding human rights 
due diligence poses the obligation on states, not directly on corporations, to ensure that 
corporations undertake human rights due diligence. Therefore, it seems that the outright 
direct binding of corporations through an international human rights treaty has been put 
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aside. The more established international law-making, where the treaty will be imple-
mented and enforced by state parties, is chosen to make it easier for states to join in seri-
ous treaty negotiations and, in time, in the proposed treaty.198 
However, even though the states remain the immediate duty-bearers, the proposed 
treaty’s actual addressees and targets are the corporations. The proposed treaty would 
importantly acknowledge the responsibility of corporations and require much more pro-
active and preventive approach from corporations regarding human rights due diligence. 
Most importantly, the proposed draft sets a mandatory human rights due diligence for 
corporations, and failure to abide by this obligation becomes a source of liability under 
national law for the violating corporation. 
Nevertheless, some experts have argued that it is not yet clear, based on the wording of 
the Revised Draft, what legal standards apply and to who, and they have advocated the 
proposed treaty to clearly impose direct obligations on corporations.199 Throughout the 
treaty process, several participants have considered that the proposed treaty should in-
clude the principle of direct responsibility of transnational corporations.200  In my opin-
ion, the OEIGWG abandoned the direct obligation of corporations too easily, as it is jus-
tified to argue that corporations actually have a level of international personality. In fact, 
as proposed already earlier in this thesis, the proposed treaty would have had the chance 
to be the final key needed in the acknowledgement of corporate subjectivity under inter-
national law. Therefore, I hope that the level of directness that the Revised Draft sets on 
corporations is not final. 
4.4 Concluding Remarks on the Key Issues Left for Future Negotiations 
The OEIGWG invited states and other stakeholders to submit their additional textual sug-
gestions on the Revised Draft by the end of February 2020. Should the working group 
remain in the same schedule as before, we might expect a second revised draft on the 
legally binding instrument in the summer 2020, which would then be the subject of the 
sixth session of the OEIGWG possibly taking place again in the next October.201  
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The Revised Draft has been complimented to be more coherent, well-constructed and 
mature text than the Zero Draft.202 For example, consensus has seemed to be found on the 
scope of the corporations to which the proposed treaty applies, which was a major issue 
in the beginning of the treaty process.  However, there are still many aspects of the pro-
posed treaty and its articles that require refinement. Especially regarding human rights 
due diligence, the level of defence for corporations as well as the directness of the corpo-
rate obligations are major open issues. 
The UNGPs were criticized for not defining some of the important concepts, such as hu-
man rights due diligence, clearly enough.203 The proposed treaty needs to be careful not 
to repeat the same mistake, since the delegations have presented concerns about the 
choice of words in connection with several of the articles. Especially in the era of digital-
ization, corporations may relate to each other in a vast array of ways, and the reference to 
“contractual relationship” needs to be amended to “business relationship” to cover all 
relevant relationships, e.g. also equity-based relationships. Using the concepts in a same 
way brings clarity to, among others, parent/subsidiary relationship, which is one of the 
most critical part of HRDD. 
When formulating the first ever article regarding mandatory human rights due diligence, 
the working group needs to carefully draft the rules so that they do not cause unintended 
consequences.204 This is particularly important considering how fast business is changing. 
The help of all the participants is required to plan the best ways for corporations to inte-
grate human rights consideration into business planning and operations. The opponents 
of the proposed treaty have even suggested that the international community is not ready 
to adopt a business and human rights treaty, since it has not yet worked out how standard 
business activities, such as trade-offs, setting priorities and managing risks, are dealt with 
in human rights framework.205 However, this is exactly why the OEIGWG has to include 
also the corporate participants in the treaty process and listen to carefully their views on 
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the content of the final HRDD article. As Steven Ratner has stated, “[w]herever lawmak-
ing occurs, the detailed elaboration of norms must directly involve all interested actors, 
whether governments, businesses, or human rights groups”.206 In the end, all the hard 
work regarding the proposed treaty would go for nothing if the treaty is not applicable to 
the business world in practice. Therefore, the most important issue left for future negoti-
ations is to carefully take into account the characteristics of corporate activities so that 
the human rights due diligence process which is required from them may be realized. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 How Mandatory HRDD Could Benefit Both Sides 
It is almost a worn-out cliché that corporations may cause adverse human rights impacts 
on local communities. However, it seems that this “cliché” needs to be repeated multiple 
times until we actually see results in business and human rights regulation. In the fifth 
session of the OEIGWG, many delegations and NGOs provided a powerful reminder on 
the urgency to prevent and address business-related human rights violations by recalling 
instances where there had not been accountability for corporations nor remedy for those 
affected: “environmental and human rights defenders being killed or otherwise attacked, 
destruction of the climate and biodiversity, pharmaceutical companies exploiting those in 
dire need of medicine, attacks on indigenous peoples, and abuses in situations of armed 
conflict”.207 Thus, the impacts are out in the open for everyone to acknowledge. Now the 
focus should be on finding the way to address such impacts and applying the result to 
corporations. 
The way towards effective corporate accountability mechanisms has been lengthy. There 
has been a flood of soft law at international level but most of such instruments are sub-
jected to complexities which often relate to their voluntary nature. It is indeed evident 
that none of the current international instruments are binding in a judicial sense. They 
rely their efficiency on the voluntary implementations on national level and the morality 
of corporations, both of which have their own issues. For example, since the UNGPs do 
not pose direct obligations even to states to have in place national legislation regarding 
corporate accountability, the NAPs that have been produced so far remain vague and gen-
eral without actually regulating the process that corporations would need to follow in 
order to assess their human rights impacts. Furthermore, without clear rules, it is hard for 
corporations to have in place adequate policies that would cover all necessary aspects in 
their responsibility for human rights protection. 
In this regard, a comprehensive binding international instrument would provide a solution 
that finally combines the corporate world and human rights in a way that both sides could 
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approve. As a matter of fact, corporations may be more willing to support a binding in-
strument than activists believe. The Economist has found in a recent study that the over-
whelming majority of executives (83%) agree that human rights are a matter for business 
as well as governments.208 Furthermore, 71% say that their company’s responsibility to 
respect these rights goes beyond simple obedience to local laws.209 Therefore, it seems 
that the time is now right to set up effective human rights systems and processes that deal 
with human rights impacts of corporations. The proposed treaty is on the right path in 
terms of providing detailed rules on substantive and procedural matters. A framework 
treaty would leave too much in the discretion of single states if it only provided some key 
principles and approaches much like the UNGPs. In order to reach a level playing field, 
all business enterprises have to follow on some level the same rules around the world. 
Such rules are likely to be formed in the shape of a human rights due diligence process. 
This thesis has showed that human rights due diligence has become to stay as the tool that 
connects business and human rights. The UNGPs represent a great step forward from 
previous efforts with clarifying the elements of HRDD. However, a judicial obligation 
for corporations to have in place HRDD will not happen by states randomly regulating 
themselves without the involvement of clear international standards. The treaty process 
has continued where the UNGPs left with HRDD and improves applicability of HRDD 
in practice by setting a mandatory HRDD. An actual responsibility to assess their human 
rights impacts leads the corporations into shedding their excuse of lack of knowledge. 
The corporate world has raised concern of heavy administrative burdens that the manda-
tory HRDD would pose them. However, HRDD is a context specific process and the re-
quirements are set taking into account each corporations’ characteristics. Furthermore, 
with putting in place reasonable standards applicable to all corporations, the corporation 
are able to fit them into their business operations. In the beginning, setting up such stand-
ards might cause additional expenses and corporations may even need to invest to third 
party experts to help them. However, in the long run, it pays off to set an effective strategy 
that takes into account the expectations of business conduct in the field of international 
human rights law since such strategy can also enhance business stability, productivity and 
long-term profitability.210 
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The goal is to make corporations aware of their possible human rights impacts so that 
they realize which way to amend and mitigate such impacts even before actual violations 
occur. Understanding human rights impacts and demonstrating respect for human rights 
may minimize litigations risks but also build a culture of trust and integrity, protect cor-
porations’ brand profile and make corporations attractive business partners.211 The cor-
porations need to take the wheel so that the consumers, investors and shareholders will 
not be the ones who find out about the corporations’ human rights impacts before them-
selves. Here a comprehensive HRDD process could help corporations, especially multi-
national corporations who are subject to a diversity of regulations that directly or indi-
rectly regulate their human rights impacts, to comply with the various regulations appli-
cable to their business operations and to address their other potential human rights im-
pacts which are not (yet) addressed by any regulation.212 
On a final note, both the UNGPs and the proposed treaty have, admittedly, their own 
advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, it is necessary to continue with a plurality of 
initiatives in order to show corporations how to pursue effective HRDD to prevent human 
rights harms.213 Nevertheless, the Doe v. Wal-Mart case that was already presented in the 
introduction illustrates how things may change with the proposed treaty. It would have 
been significantly harder for the court to reach the conclusion that Wal-Mart had only 
reserved a right to inspect, which did not amount to a duty to inspect the working condi-
tions in their supply chain, if there had been mandatory human rights due diligence obli-
gation for Wal-Mart, as the proposed treaty requires.214 
5.2 Ways to Strengthen the Proposed Treaty and Its HRDD Provision 
In the process of drafting the proposed treaty, the Revised Draft has clearly been a wel-
come and crucial step towards to goal to establish a legally binding instrument in the field 
of business and human rights. The Revised Draft over-came already most of the most 
serious objections relating to especially the scope of the proposed treaty and its comple-
                                                 
211 See DLA Piper, International Business and Human Rights Overview. 
212 McCorquodale and others 2017, p. 204. 
213 See Černič 2015. 
214 See Angelini 2018. 
54 
 
mentary character in relation to other international instruments, mainly the UNGPs. How-
ever, there are still many aspects of the treaty that could be strengthened before the pro-
posed treaty reaches its final form. 
One of the most obvious aspects that relate to the binding instrument’s nature as an inter-
national treaty is that the proposed treaty will need a broad support in order to successfully 
regulate corporate human rights abuse. Since most of the multinational corporations are 
domiciled in Western states, the support is particularly needed from the industrialized 
states – the ones that were the most reluctant to participate in the beginning of the treaty 
process. On the one hand, it seems that the current state of the world with many nationalist 
movements might make it impossible to find an international consensus on such contro-
versial matter as business and human rights. On the other hand, digitalization has made 
the information available worldwide in an unprecedented way and made it easier for var-
ious groups to get their voices heard. It might be unfeasible for the states to refrain from 
conducting a binding business and human rights treaty, especially when also the corpora-
tions that they are dependent on are more vocal on enhancing human rights protection 
alongside the NGOs and private persons. 
In order to involve states in the treaty process, compromises have already at this stage 
been made. Regretfully, it seems that the working group has abandoned the extension of 
judicial obligations directly to corporations. Still in the Elements corporations were sug-
gested to be recognized alongside the states to have direct obligations through the pro-
posed treaty. However, the obligations in the Zero Draft were only directed to states an-
ymore. This thesis has established that in theory and also in practice it could have been 
plausible to acknowledge corporations as duty-bearers alongside the states due to their 
level of international personality. In my opinion, this would have made the treaty stronger 
since there remain weaknesses in domestic legislations such as lack of human rights safe-
guards and non-recognition of corporate criminal responsibility. Nevertheless, the pro-
posed treaty marks a great improvement from the non-binding instruments, since it rec-
ognizes the duties of corporations under international law in an unprecedented way, even 
though the states would remain the sole subject of direct obligations. 
Thus, one of the greatest improvements of the proposed treaty would be its provision 
regarding mandatory human rights due diligence. However, in the fast-changing world 
and business environment, the provision needs to be drafted carefully so that it will not 
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be already out-of-date when the treaty is enforced. Some of the direst consequences that 
HRDD needs to be able to cover are connected with digitalization. One aspect is the mas-
sive amount of hardware that the technology companies, such as Apple and Samsung, 
need in developing more and more digital devices. The news articles and NGOs reports 
have covered stories relating to especially Congo’s mining of cobalt which is needed for 
the lithium-ion batteries in most of the smartphones and laptops.215 The Washington Post 
revealed in its article in 2016 that few corporations regularly track where their cobalt 
comes from, and even though some corporations and the government officials of Congo 
are aware of the human rights abuses, such as infringement of the right to enjoy just and 
favorable conditions of work, little has been carried on to enhance the protection of work-
ers on the mining sites. The state’s problem is that it is too poor to tackle these issues 
alone, and so far, many corporations have hidden behind the statement of unawareness 
while some have claimed to plan to increase scrutiny but with no real results.216 The more 
the world shifts to using digitalized equipment, the more the corporations need to develop 
lithium-ion products and the more the cobalt is dug in the mines. As an estimated 80% of 
the global trade passes through supply chains,217 the monitoring of supply chains needs 
to form an essential part of the mandatory human rights due diligence. The human rights 
impacts are manageable – now we need to see the speech turn into action. 
Another aspect that the mandatory HRDD needs to take into account is related to the 
digital age and the increasing power of information technology companies. So much of 
our lives is carried out online that corporations such as Facebook and Google hold mas-
sive amount of data on us and have a huge impact on people’s human rights, such as 
privacy and freedom of expression, all over the world. With the great amount of data 
comes perhaps greater power than corporations from any other industry hold. Access 
Now, an NGO focused on digital rights, has listed several examples of human rights vio-
lations taking place online including already everyday occurrences of data breaches and 
censorship as well as noticeable bigger incidents such as the Myanmar military’s use of 
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Facebook to incite genocide.218 Therefore, it is highly important to ensure that the man-
datory human rights due diligence shall cover also human rights online. In this regard, 
HRDD could include a study of the surveillance practices of a country where the infor-
mation technology company intends to sell networking equipment to the government.219 
In addition, the mandatory human rights due diligence will achieve its true potential by 
focusing on increasing transparency with comprehensive reporting obligations. When the 
proposed treaty increases legal requirements for reporting, also the demand for greater 
transparency of these reports will increase.220 Using an international standard of HRDD 
reporting also enables the corporations to present the information in a way that is increas-
ingly expected by external stakeholders.221 Reporting obligation is listed as one of the 
elements of HRDD in the Revised Draft’s Article 5.3(c), but the explicit mentioning of 
transparency is missing. Here digital solutions should be taken into consideration as 
providing possible answers for increased transparency. Some have suggested that block-
chain-based systems are the way forward to ensure, among others, responsible sourcing 
in supply chains.222 Layered blockchain systems would allow corporations to be confident 
in their sourcing and safely report their supply chain due diligence to governments as well 
as customers by providing keys to encrypted data without disclosing their supply chains 
to competitors.223 
Finally, it should also be kept in mind that the development does not stop in the proposed 
treaty. The content of what kind of HRDD is necessary under different circumstances is 
further clarified as case law and business practice develop.224 The work with business and 
human rights shall continue and no single instrument alone changes the state of human 
rights responsibility. However, the reform has been started and binding international ob-
ligations regarding corporate human rights due diligence also set pressure on states to 
actively enhance their national legislations regulating the matter. Thus, I agree with the 
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United Nations Deputy High Commissioner of Human Rights, who stated in her opening 
at the OEIGWG’s fifth session that “[a] business and human rights treaty is not a cure, 
but it can and must be part of the solution”.225 
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